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generate sizable differences in terms of their incidence on private deleveraging dynamics and, 
hence, on their overall output costs of fiscal consolidations. 
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1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the recent crisis, public debt as a percentage of GDP has
increased by more than 20 points on average in the OECD countries, up to levels
hardly ever seen before in peacetime. For instance, in the euro area, public debt
at the end of 2015 was almost 1.5 times higher than in 2007, with a relatively large
number of countries where this multiple was well above 2 and, even, some where debt
has more than tripled during this period. Absent ination, and with the prospects
of fragile growth in the coming years, considerable budgetary adjustments are called
for to reduce public debt-to-GDP ratios towards more sustainable levels. This raises
a number of questions about the macroeconomic impact of scal consolidations and
the best strategy to conduct these processes.
Issues like the appropriate pace of scal consolidations, or whether these should
be based on spending cuts or tax hikes, have been thoroughly discussed in the litera-
ture. In the aftermath of the nancial crisis, these questions acquire a new dimension
since the e¤ectiveness and costs of scal retrenchments are likely to be a¤ected by
the lack of room of manoeuvre of conventional monetary policy at the zero lower
bound (ZLB) and by the legacy of high private debt. The relevance of the ZLB
for scal policy has been extensively studied but the literature has largely ignored
the bidirectional links between public and private debt-consolidation processes. The
mutual interaction between public and private deleveraging has occupied a central
role in policy discussions, but there is scant academic research that considers how
consolidation e¤orts by the government impinge upon private debt reduction and
spending decisions and, conversely, how private deleveraging shapes the impact of
scal consolidations. Placing private and public debt consolidation under the same
umbrella helps understand better the e¤ect of alternative scal consolidation strate-
gies and the determinants of the length, depth and costs of private deleveraging. In
this paper we develop a framework to analyze this interaction.
Inspired by the current macronancial landscape faced by a number of countries in
the euro area that are embarked in ambitious scal consolidations, we build a general
equilibrium model of an economy that belongs to a monetary union. The lack of an
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independent monetary policy produces e¤ects similar to those of a binding ZLB but of
a more structural nature. In the model, private debt is long-term and borrowers face
collateral constraints. The combination of long-term debt and collateral restrictions
give rise to an asymmetric double debt-regime. When the value of collateral is
su¢ ciently high, borrowers receive new credit ows, in an amount determined by
such value; when the latter is low, credit ows freeze and outstanding debt is reduced
at the pre-set contractual amortization rate, thus pushing the economy into a slow
deleveraging path. Only su¢ ciently large negative shocks (like e.g. an intense credit-
crunch or a large scal contraction) drive the economy into this last regime. As time
passes and legacy debts are progressively paid back, debtorsnet worth recovers up
to a point at which the value of collateral is su¢ ciently high so as to sustain new
credit ows, thus bringing the deleveraging process to its end. In this way, the length
and intensity of private deleveraging are endogenously determined in the model.
In this context, we analyze how the size, speed and composition of scal consoli-
dations a¤ect the economy, with particular attention on how consolidations interact
with private deleveraging. Our main results can be summarized as follows. First,
the size of scal consolidation has di¤erent e¤ects on scal sacrice ratios at di¤erent
horizons. On the one hand, larger scal consolidations imply lower scal sacrice ra-
tios (i.e. output losses per unit of reduction in the long-run government debt-to-GDP
ratio) in the short run. When the scal shock is small, constrained agents have to
reduce their spending along with the falling excess collateral(collateralizable value
of their real estate holdings net of outstanding debt) as long as the latter is positive.
If the scal contraction is large enough, borrowersexcess collateral vanishes as it
does the ow of new loans. As mortgage contracts imply that borrowers do not have
to reduce their outstanding debt down to the lower collateral value, in this regime,
they pay the amortization rate without receiving new credit. In this way, long-term
mortgages prevent debtorsnet debt ows and hence their spending capacity from
falling proportionally to the size of the shock. Thus, by breaking the link between
debt dynamics and collateral values while in a deleveraging phase, long-term debt
contracts cushion the impact of negative scal shocks on borrowersspending capac-
ity. We label this mechanism as the bu¤ering e¤ect. On the other hand, larger
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consolidations imply higher relative output losses over the medium run, by endoge-
nously increasing the duration and depth of private deleveraging; we call this the
duration e¤ect.
Second, as regards the speed of a scal consolidation (of a given size), we nd that
front-loaded scal consolidations aimed at lowering the government debt-to-GDP
ratio faster entail higher welfare costs as compared with more gradual adjustments.
This is because the short-run utility costs of more aggressive consolidations dominate
the medium-run gains in present-discounted terms. Key to this result is the fact
that faster consolidations produce larger falls of collateral values which, in turn,
prolong the duration of borrowersdeleveraging phase and postpone the recovery
following a large negative shock. Third, and nally, scal adjustments based on
either expenditure cuts or capital tax hikes have a disproportionate e¤ects on the
duration and the macroeconomic costs of private deleveraging vis-à-vis those based
on consumption or labor income tax hikes.
Our results shed some light on the ongoing debate about the appropriate design of
scal consolidations in terms of their size, speed and composition. Some pundits have
advocated large and quick scal adjustments as a means of bringing public debt back
into a sustainable path. Such a strategy is typically defended upon the grounds that
a quick adjustment reduces the period of scal pain and gets public nances rapidly
back in good shape so that they can play a countercyclical role. According to this
view, even if they accentuate the depth of the recession, sharp scal adjustments
might make it shorter and eventually less painful. Other authors support milder
and/or more gradual consolidations when possible, arguing that scal multipliers
are larger in recessions so that postponing the bulk of the scal retrenchment until
the economy starts recovering would be the appropriate recipe. The presence of
long term debt in our model reinforces the latter policy prescription, although it
turns the argument around. Smaller consolidations actually increase the (relative)
output costs in the short-run, precisely when the recession is more severe, due to
the above-mentioned bu¤ering e¤ect of long-term debt on private spending. Rather,
what makes small consolidations more benign in relative terms over the medium run
is the fact that, by favoring a faster recovery in the value of collateral, they shorten
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the duration of the deleveraging phase, thus bringing forward the time at which
borrowers regain access to fresh credit.
The impact of scal consolidation on the length and intensity of private delever-
aging are key implications of our model. In that sense, our results must be inter-
preted as uncovering an often neglected channel that might be relevant in the design
of consolidation packages, namely the endogenous response of private deleveraging.
Other channels, such as deationary e¤ects or the lack of monetary accommodation,
are of lesser importance in our context. Likewise, scal rules in our model always
render public debt sustainable and we do not consider an endogenous response of
sovereign spreads. Thus, risks to sustainability or imperfect credibility of scal policy
announcements, which might constitute powerful arguments in favor of fast consoli-
dation programs, are absent here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briey describe the related
literature in Section 2. The model and the baseline calibration are presented in
Section 3. In Section 4 we analyze the impact of alternative consolidation strategies
and in Section 5 we perform a similar exercise against the backdrop of a credit crunch
scenario. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
There is a vast literature assessing the e¤ects of consolidations. A fair reading of the
evidence suggests that scal consolidations are successful in delivering conditions
more favorable for growth in the medium term, although they might exert non-
negligible short term output losses.1 Also, adjustments in public spending, rather
than tax hikes, make these consolidations more e¤ective and lasting, and impose
a lesser drag on the economy in the short run.2 For instance, Kumar, Leigh and
1There is also a strand of the empirical literature that nds that, under some conditions, scal
consolidations might even be benecial in the short run. See, among others, Alesina and Ardagna
(2009), Cogan, Taylor, Wieland and Wolters (2013), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), Hemming, Kell
and Mahfouz (2002) and Perotti (1999).
2von Hagen, Hallet and Strauch (2001) nd that government spending cuts are key in successful
scal consolidations and point out to the importance of institutional arrangements in pursuing these
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Plekhanov (2007) study scal consolidations in 24 OECD countries and nd that
they can have positive long-run e¤ects, particularly when the gain in scal space is
used to cut capital income taxes. However, these long-run gains may not occur if
the consolidation involves cuts in public infrastructure spending. Forni, Monteforte
and Sessa, (2009) nd that scal consolidations in the euro area increase GDP and
all its components over the long run by around 5%  7%.
Wieland and Wolters (2013) have simulated the e¤ect of a scal consolidation
strategy in the United States that brings the budget to balance and nd also a
positive and signicant e¤ect on GDP. Almeida, Castro, Mourinho and Maria (2013)
simulate the impact on economic activity and welfare of a permanent decline in the
ratio of public debt to GDP in a small euro area economy with no independent
monetary policy. They nd that spending cuts (in government consumption and
transfers to households) combined with a reduction in the labor income tax have
positive long-run impacts on economic activity and signicantly improve the net
foreign asset position. This policy mix is also found to penalize real GDP by less
than tax hikes. As for the timing, they conclude that smooth scal adjustments
reduce the negative impact on output but prolong the period before the economy
reaps their full benets.
Some of these results have been called into question in the aftermath of the
nancial crisis. For one thing, in many jurisdictions, the capacity of monetary policy
to mitigate the short run costs of scal retrenchments is limited by ZLB, which is
thought to raise the magnitude of scal multipliers (Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Rebelo, 2011 and Woodford, 2011). Moreover, Eggertsson (2010) argues that, unlike
outside the ZLB, the output e¤ect of spending cuts is then higher than that of tax
rate hikes. Erceg and Lindé (2013) nd similar conclusions in a model of a monetary
union, in which small open economies lose control of monetary policies.3 In the same
vein, the IMF (2014) has reported that government spending cuts have more negative
e¤ects on employment than tax-based consolidations after a protracted recession.
But the ZLB and scal policy are intertwined in more complex ways. For instance,
adjustments.
3See also Farhi and Werning (2012) and IMF, Fiscal Monitor, October 2014, c.2
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Erceg and Lindé (2014) show that the size of the scal multiplier also depends on the
incidence of scal shocks on the duration of the ZLB regime. Also, Bi, Leeper and
Leith (2013) study the conditions under which consolidations subject to uncertainty
about their composition and intensity may be expansionary in the short run, and
conclude that such conditions are likely to be more demanding when they are based
on spending cuts and the interest rate approaches the ZLB.
The recent nancial crisis has left behind a landscape of heavily indebted house-
holds and rms. This situation is likely to a¤ect spending decisions and, hence, it
seems natural to incorporate considerations about private indebtedness in the analy-
sis of scal policies. In this vein, Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) show how scal
multipliers increase in the presence of high private debt.4 Despite this, there have
been few attempts to analyze jointly the dynamics of private and pubic debt. Ba-
tini, Melina and Villa (2016) is one exception. They nd that the drag that high
private debt imposes on economic growth is more severe than the one caused by
public indebtedness. As for scal policy, they argue that following a contractionary
shock it should keep the appropriate pace to sustain public nances without inict-
ing an additional burden on the recovery process. Whereas some authors argue that,
despite their stronger short-term impact on GDP, front-loading adjustments might
entail lower costs in present value terms (ECB, Monthly Bulletin, 2014), others de-
fend gradual consolidations, upon the hypothesis that short term scal multipliers
in the aftermath of a nancial crisis are likely to be higher than long-term ones.5 In
this spirit, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) advocate modulating scal adjustments in
order to avoid the large scal multipliers that are typically associated to recessions.6
Moreover, large multipliers in the short run can cast a long shadow on output in the
presence of hysteresis channels.7
4Other authors have conrmed this conection in a variety of theoretical and empirical settings.
Andrés, Boscá and Ferri (2015) discuss this e¤ect in the context of collateralized debt and labor
market frictions. Kaplan, Violante and . Weidner (2014) and Cloyne and Surico (2014) analyze the
relationship between household nancial position and spending.
5See Fletcher and Sandri (2015) and Corsetti, Kuester Meier and Müller (2010).
6Corsetti, Kuester, Meier, and Müller, (2013) emphasize that this may be particularly true when
sovereign spreads are not too high or too sensitive to Debt/GDP ratios.
7See See Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) and Hernández de Cos and Moral-Benito (2013)
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To the best of our knowledge, this literature does not allow for the endogenous
determination of the duration and intensity of deleveraging of the private sector. The
presence of long term collateralized debt in our model has a profound e¤ect on the
way private spending adjusts to exogenous shocks, scal or otherwise. Long-term
debt contracts induce non-linearities in the multipliers associated to scal retrench-
ments and, what is more important, establish a theoretical link between the intensity
and timing of scal adjustments and the duration and costs of private deleveraging
processes and, hence, of recessions.
3 Model
We present a general equilibrium model of a small open economy that belongs to a
monetary union. The real side of the economy is standard and there are several types
of consumers who di¤er in the intensity with which they discount the future. Entre-
preneurs produce an intermediate good using labor and consumption goods and sell
it to retailers, who transform it into consumption good varieties. Construction rms
produce real estate, both for residential and commercial use, whereas equipment
capital is produced by capital goods producers. Retailers in the consumption-goods
sector are characterized by monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities, all other
goods markets operate under perfect competition. The scal authority collects taxes
on households and entrepreneurs, consumes, and issues non-contingent nominal debt,
according to a scal rule. Public debt is held by patient domestic agents and for-
eigners.
In what follows, we describe the basic elements of the model. In the notation
used herein, all variables are expressed in real terms unless otherwise specied, with
the consumption goods basket acting as the numeraire. Appendix A contains the
whole set of equilibrium conditions.
on the size of multipliers in di¢ cult times and DeLong and Summers (2012) and Fatás and Summers
(2015), reggarding the size of hysteresis e¤etcs.
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3.1 Households
Households obtain utility from consumption goods and from occupying housing units.
There are three types of consumers: patient households, impatient households, and
(impatient) entrepreneurs. In the class of equilibria analyzed in the following sections,
the latter two groups borrow from the former and from the rest of the monetary
union by issuing long-term nominal debt. In periods in which borrowers are able
to receive new credit ows, they do so subject to collateral constraints. Real estate
is the only collateralizable asset. We will henceforth refer to impatient and patient
households as constrainedand unconstrainedhouseholds, respectively. There is a
representative constrained household and a representative unconstrained household,
denoted respectively by superscripts c and u.
3.1.1 Cost minimization
Households consume a basket of home and foreign goods, denoted respectively by
subscripts H and F ,
cxt =

!
1="H
H
 
cxH;t
("H 1)="H + (1  !H)1="H  cxF;t("H 1)="H"H=("H 1) ; (1)
for x = c; u; cxH;t is a basket of domestic good varieties,
cxH;t =
Z 1
0
cxH;t (z)
("p 1)="p dz
"p=("p 1)
; (2)
where "p > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across consumption varieties z 2 [0; 1].
Let PH;t (z) denote the price of home good variety z, and PF;t the price of the foreign
goods basket. Household x = c; u minimizes nominal consumption expenditure,R 1
0
PH;t (z) c
x
H;t (z) dz + PF;tc
x
F;t, subject to (1) and (2). The rst order conditions of
the static cost minimization problem can be expressed as
cxH;t = !H

PH;t
Pt
 "H
cxt ; c
x
F;t = (1  !H)

PF;t
Pt
 "H
cxt ; c
x
H;t (z) =

PH;t (z)
PH;t
 "p
cxH;t;
(3)
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where
Pt =
 
!HP
1 "H
H;t + (1  !H)P 1 "HF;t
1=(1 "H)
; PH;t =
Z 1
0
PH;t (z)
1 "p dz
1=(1 "p)
are the consumer price index (CPI) and the producer price index (PPI), respectively.
Nominal spending in domestic goods equals
R 1
0
PH;t (z) c
x
H;t (z) dz = PH;tc
x
H;t, whereas
total nominal consumption spending equals PH;tcxH;t + PF;tc
x
F;t = Ptc
x
t .
As noted before, consumption goods are also used as inputs by construction rms
and equipment capital producers. The latter are assumed to combine home and
foreign goods analogously to households, and similarly for domestic good varieties.
This gives rise to investment demand functions analogous to (3).
3.1.2 Unconstrained households
The unconstrained household maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
(u)t
(
log (cut ) + # log (h
u
t )  
Z 1
0
nut (i)
1+'
1 + '
di
)
; (4)
where nut (i) are labor services of type i 2 [0; 1] and hut are housing units, subject to
the following budget constraint (expressed in units of the consumption goods basket),
(1 +  ct) c
u
t + dt + b
gu
t + p
h
t

hut   (1  h)hut 1

=
Rt 1
t
 
dt 1 + b
gu
t 1

+(1  wt )
Z 1
0
Wt (i)
Pt
nut (i) di  Tt;
where dt is the real value of net private international debt holdings, b
gu
t is the real
value of nominal domestic government debt holdings, Rt is the gross riskless nominal
interest rate, h is the depreciation rate of real estate, pht is the real price of real estate,
t  Pt=Pt 1 is gross CPI ination, Wt (i) is the nominal wage for labor services of
type i,  ct and 
w
t are tax rates on consumption and labor income, respectively, and
Tt are lump-sum taxes. The rst order conditions are standard (see Appendix A).
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3.1.3 Constrained households
The constrained households preferences are given by
E0
1X
t=0
t
(
log (cct) + # log (ht)  
Z 1
0
nct (i)
1+'
1 + '
di
)
; (5)
where  < u, i.e. the constrained household is relatively impatient; ht and nct (i) are
housings units owned and type-i labor services supplied by the constrained household,
respectively. The household faces the following budget constraint,
(1 +  ct) c
c
t +
Rt 1
t
bt 1+ pht [ht   (1  h)ht 1] = bt+(1  wt )
Z 1
0
Wt (i)
Pt
nct (i) di Tt;
where bt is the real value of household debt outstanding at the end of period t.
Unlike in most of the literature, which typically assumes short-term (one-period)
debt, we assume that private debt contracts are long-term. In the interest of tractabil-
ity, we assume that at the beginning of time t the household repays a fraction 1  
of all nominal debt outstanding at the end of period t   1, regardless of when that
debt was issued.8 This type of perpetual debt is similar to the one proposed by
Woodford (2001) as a tractable way of modelling long-term debt. In real terms, the
outstanding principal of household debt then evolves as follows,
bt =
bt 1
t
+ bnewt   (1  )
bt 1
t
= bnewt + 
bt 1
t
; (6)
where bnewt is gross new credit net of voluntary amortizations, i.e. amortizations
beyond the contractual debt repayment (1  ) bt 1=t.
Following Iacoviello (2005) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), outstanding debt bt
cannot exceed a fraction mt (the loan-to-value ratio, which we assume to be exoge-
nously time-varying) of the expected discounted value of the households residential
stock: bt  mtR 1t Ett+1pht+1ht. For brevity, we will refer to such pledgeable value of
8Total debt repayments in each period are then (1  ) + (Rt 1   1) times nominal debt out-
standing, i.e. the sum of amortization and interest payments.
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collateral as collateral value. This debt limit, however, is only e¤ective as long as it
exceeds bt 1=t, which we will henceforth refer to as the contractual amortization
path. We may refer to the gap between collateral value and the contractual amor-
tization path as excess collateral. If the collateral value falls below such path (i.e.
if excess collateral becomes negative), lowering bt to the value of collateral would
require lenders not only to reduce gross new credit to zero (its lower bound), but
also to impose additional amortizations beyond those agreed in the contract (i.e.
bnewt < 0). Since lenders cannot force borrowers to pay back faster than the con-
tractual amortization rate, the contractual amortization path becomes the e¤ective
debt limit. Therefore, long run debt implies the following asymmetric borrowing
constraint,
bt  R 1t mtEtt+1pht+1ht; if
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1ht  
bt 1
t
; (7)
bt   bt 1
t
; if
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1ht < 
bt 1
t
: (8)
This asymmetry gives rise to a double debt regime. In normal times, in which collat-
eral values exceed the contractual amortization path, debt is restricted by the former.
In this baseline regime, households can receive new credit against their housing col-
lateral, with the constraint that such new credit does not exceed the gap between
collateral values and the amortization path.9 However, in the face of shocks that
reduce collateral values su¢ ciently, the economy switches to an alternative regime,
in which new credit dries up and debt is restricted by the contractual amortization
path.10 An important element of our framework is that changes from one regime to
the other take place endogenously.
9Indeed, from (6) and (7) we obtain bnewt  mtR 1t Ett+1pht+1ht   bt 1=t.
10From (6) and (8):
 
mtR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1ht   bt 1=t

< 0) bnewt = 0.
13
3.2 Production
3.2.1 Entrepreneurs
A representative entrepreneur produces an intermediate product and sells it to re-
tailers at a perfectly competitive real (CPI-deated) price mct. The entrepreneur
maximizes
E0
1X
t=0
t log cet ; (9)
with the consumption basket cet dened analogously to (1), subject to a budget
constraint. Entrepreneurs, who obtain operating prots from their activities, are
also assumed to own the rms in the other productive sectors of the economy. All
operating prots (net of capital depreciation) are taxed at rate  kt ; since prots accrue
to entrepreneurs and these are the sole owners of productive capital in the model,
we will henceforth refer to  kt as the capital income tax. The entrepreneurs budget
constraint is given by
(1 +  ct) c
e
t =
 
1   kt

mcty
e
t  
Wt
Pt
net

+ bet  
Rt 1
t
bet 1   pht

het   (1  h)het 1

 qt [kt   (1  k) kt 1] +  kt
 
hp
h
t h
e
t 1 + kqtkt 1

+
 
1   kt
 X
s=r;h;k
st ;
yet = k
k
t 1
 
het 1
h (net)1 k h ;
where yet is output of the intermediate good, kt 1 is capital equipment with unit price
qt and a depreciation rate k, het 1 is commercial real estate, n
e
t is a basket of labor
services, Wt is a nominal wage index, bet is the real value of entrepreneurial debt
outstanding at the end of period t, and fstgs=r;h;k are real prots from the retail,
construction and equipment goods-producing sectors.
Entrepreneursmaximization is also subject to an asymmetric borrowing con-
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straint analogous to the one on constrained households,
bet  R 1t metEtt+1pht+1het ; if
met
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t  e
bet 1
t
; (10)
bet  e
bet 1
t
; if
met
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < 
e b
e
t 1
t
; (11)
where we allow for a di¤erent loan-to-value ratio (met) and contractual amortization
rate (1  e) for entrepreneurs.
3.2.2 Retailers
A continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by z 2 [0; 1] purchase
the intermediate input from entrepreneurs at the real price mct, and transform it
one for one into nal good varieties. Retailersreal marginal cost is thus mct. Each
retailer z faces a demand curve
yt (z) =

PH;t (z)
PH;t
 "p
yt  ydt (PH;t (z)) ; (12)
where yt is aggregate demand of the consumption basket (to be derived below).
Let et  1= [cet (1 +  ct)] denote the entrepreneurs marginal utility of real income.
Assuming Calvo (1983) price-setting, a retailer that has the chance of setting its
nominal price at time t solves
max
PH;t(z)
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s 
e
t+s
et
 
1   kt+s
 PH;t (z)
Pt+s
 mct+s

ydt+s (PH;t (z)) ;
where p is the probability of not adjusting the price and  p is a tax rate on retailers
revenue. The rst-order condition is standard, with all time-t price setters choosing
a common optimal price ~PH;t.
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3.2.3 Construction and capital producing rms
A representative construction rm maximizes its expected discounted stream of prof-
its, E0
P1
t=0 
t et
e0
 
1   kt

ht , where 
h
t = p
h
t I
h
t  WtPt nht  iht , subject to the production
technology
Iht =
 
nht
!(
iht
"
1  h
2

iht
iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
;
where nht are labor services, i
h
t are consumption goods, and I
h
t are new real estate
units.11
Also, a representative equipment capital producer maximizes its expected dis-
counted stream of prots, E0
P1
t=0 
t et
e0
 
1   kt

kt , where 
k
t = qtIt  it, subject to
the technology
It = it
"
1  k
2

it
it 1
  1
2#
;
where it are consumption goods, and It are new equipment capital goods.
3.3 Wage setting
Both entrepreneurs and construction rms use a basket of labor services o¤ered by
constrained and unconstrained households,
nst = (n
s;c
t )
s (ns;ut )
1 s ;
where ns;xt are labor services provided by type-x household, x = c; u, to each sector
s = e; h. We assume that both worker types (constrained and unconstrained) earn
the same wage. Cost minimization then implies (1  s)ns;ct = sns;ut , for s = e; h.
From each household type, each sector demands in turn a basket of labor service
11We include labor services in the production function of construction rms so as to allow for
long-run changes in real estate prices. Without labor in construction (! = 0), real estate prices are
always unity in the long run. More generally, it can be shown that phss = (wss)
!
! ! (1  !) (1 !).
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varieties,
ns;xt =
Z 1
0
ns;xt (i)
("w 1)="w di
"w=("w 1)
;
for x = c; u and s = e; h, where "w > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across
labor varieties i 2 [0; 1]. Cost minimization implies ns;xt (i) = (Wt (i) =Wt) "w ns;xt ,
for x = c; u and s = e; h, where Wt  (
R 1
0
Wt (i)
1 "w di)1=(1 "w) is the nominal wage
index. Total demand for each variety of labor services is thus
nxt (i)  ne;xt (i) + nh;xt (i) =

Wt (i)
Wt
 "w 
ne;xt + n
h;x
t

 nd;xt (Wt (i)) ;
for x = c; u. Total nominal wage income earned by each type-x household equalsR 1
0
Wt (i)n
x
t (i) di = Wtn
x
t , where n
x
t  ne;xt + nh;xt .
As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000; EHL), nominal wages are set à la Calvo
(1983). In particular, a union representing all type-i workers maximizes the utility
of the households to which such workers belong. Let xt  1= [cxt (1 +  ct)] denote the
marginal utility of real income for each household type x = c; u. Then, a union that
has the chance to reset the nominal wage at time t chooses Wt (i) to maximize
X
x=c;u
Et
1X
s=0
(xw)
s
264xt+s  1  wt+sWt (i)Pt+s nd;xt+s (Wt (i))  

nd;xt+s (Wt (i))
1+'
1 + '
375 ;
where w is the probability of not adjusting the wage and 
c = . All time-t wage-
setters choose a common optimal wage ~Wt; see the rst-order condition in the Ap-
pendix.
3.4 International linkages
A representative exporter produces a basket of domestic consumption goods: xt =
(
R 1
0
xt (z)
("p 1)="p dz)"p=("p 1), where xt (z) is demand for each domestic good va-
riety. Cost minimization implies that the exporters demand for each variety is
xt (z) = (PH;t (z) =PH;t)
 "p xt, and total spending is
R 1
0
PH;t (z)xt (z) dz = PH;txt.
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The exporter sells the basket xt in export markets under perfect competition. The
zero prot condition implies that the market price of the export basket is exactly
PH;t. Assuming that foreign consumerspreferences are analogous to those of domes-
tic consumers, foreign demand for the basket of domestic goods is given by
xt = 

PH;t
PF;t
 "F
yF;t;
where PF;t and yF;t are the foreign price level and aggregate demand (both exogenous)
and "F is the price elasticity of exports. Dening the terms of trade pt  PH;t=PF;t,
the latter evolve according to pt = p

t 1H;t=F;t;where F;t  PF;t=PF;t 1 is foreign
ination.
As mentioned before, domestic agents can lend to and borrow from foreigners and
other domestic agents at the riskless nominal rate Rt. Following standard practice
in the literature, in order to guarantee stationarity of the countrys net foreign asset
position, we assume that Rt is given by
Rt = R
 exp

  Ptnfat
PH;tgdpt

;
for  > 0, where R is the area-wide nominal interest rate (which is assumed to be
constant here), and nfat and gdpt are the countrys real (CPI-deated) net foreign
asset position and real (PPI-deated) GDP, both to be dened later.
3.5 Fiscal authority
Real (CPI-deated) government debt bgt evolves as follows,
bgt =
Rt 1
t
bgt 1 +
PH;t
Pt
gt   2Tt   wt
Wt
Pt
 
nCt + n
U
t
   ct  cCt + cUt + cet (13)
  kt
"
mcty
e
t  
Wt
Pt
net  
 
hp
h
t h
e
t 1 + kqtkt 1

+
P
s=r;h;k
st
#
:
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We have assumed full home bias in government consumption, such that its nominal
value equals PH;tgt. A scal rule ensures stability of government debt. In particular,
we will consider rules of the form
fit = fit 1 + b
 
bgyt 1   bgy

+ b
 
bgyt   bgyt 1

; (14)
where bgyt  Ptb
g
t
PH;tgdpt
is the government debt-to-GDP ratio, bgy is its long-run target,
and fi 2 fg; w;  c;  kg is the scal instrument that is endogenized through the scal
rule, to be specied in each case below. The other scal instruments are held constant
at the steady state level fi 2 fg; w;  c;  kg.
3.6 Aggregation and market clearing
Each retailer z demands ydt (PH;t (z)) units of the intermediate input, as given by
(12). Total demand for the latter equals
R 1
0
ydt (PH;t (z)) dz = ytt, where t R 1
0
(PH;t (z) =PH;t)
 "p dz denotes relative price dispersion. Market clearing in the
intermediate good market thus requires
kkt 1
 
het 1
h (net)1 h k = ytt:
As noted before, investment-goods producers and exporters demand the same combi-
nation of domestic consumption goods as consumers. Therefore, aggregate demand
for the basket of domestic consumption goods is given by,
yt = c
c
H;t + c
u
H;t + c
e
H;t + iH;t + i
h
H;t + gt + xt: (15)
Total demand for real estate must equal total supply,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1  h)
 
ht 1 + hut 1 + h
e
t 1

:
Total demand for equipment capital must equal total supply
kt = It + (1  k) kt 1:
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Labor market clearing requires
nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t :
Total supply of government debt equals total demand by nationals, i.e. unconstrained
households (bgut ), and by foreigners (b
g
t ): b
g
t = b
gu
t + b
g
t . We may combine all market
clearing conditions and budget constraints to obtain the current account identity,
nfat =
Rt 1
t
nfat 1 +
PH;t
Pt
xt   PF;t
Pt
 
ccF;t + c
u
F;t + c
e
F;t + iF;t + i
h
F;t

;
where
nfat  dt   bt   bet   bgt = (dt + bgut )  bt   bet   bgt
is the real (CPI-deated) net foreign asset position.12 We nally dene real (PPI-
deated) GDP as
gdpt  yt + Pt
PH;t
(qtIt   it) + Pt
PH;t
 
pht I
h
t   iht

=
Pt
PH;t
ctott +
Pt
PH;t
 
qtIt + p
h
t I
h
t

+ gt +

xt   PF;t
PH;t
 
ctotF;t + iF;t + i
h
F;t

;
where in the second equality we have used (15) and zH;t = PtPH;t zt  
PF;t
PH;t
zF;t for
z = cc; cu; ce; i; ih, and where ctott  cct+cut+cet is total consumption (total consumption
imports ctotF;t are dened analogously).
3.7 Calibration and solution method
We calibrate the model to the Spanish economy. As explained in the introduction,
we are motivated by the recent experience of developed countries, which are still
12Notice that the distribution of unconstrained householdsnancial wealth between international
and government bonds (dt; b
gu
t ) is undeterminate, as only their sum dt + b
gu
t is pinned down in
equilibrium. This implies that the distribution of the government debt stock (bgt ) between domestic
and foreign holders (bgut ; b
g
t ) is also undeterminate, although it does not a¤ect equilibrium dynamics
either.
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embarked in a lengthy process of both scal consolidation and private sector delever-
aging, Spain being a good example thereof. The time period is a quarter. We match
the models steady state to a number of empirical targets in 2007, the year prior to
the start of the nancial crisis. Hence, our models steady state should be interpreted
as the economys initial condition for the purpose of our simulation exercises.
The discount factor of impatient agents is set to  = 0:98, following Iacoviello
(2005). For patient households, we choose u = 1:025 1=4, which is consistent with
a steady state nominal interest rate of Rss = 1:0251=4ss = Re  (nfa
y
ss). The union-
wide ination is F;ss = 1, which implies H;ss = ss = 1 in a stationary equilibrium.
The unions nominal interest rate is R = 1:021=4 and we set  to replicate net foreign
assets over GDP in 2007, nfayss =  79:3%. The inverse labor supply elasticity is set
to ' = 4, consistently with a large body of micro evidence. The weight parameter in
the consumption basket, !H , is set to match gross exports over GDP in 2007 (26:9%).
The price elasticity of exports and imports is set to "F = "H = 1 (García et al., 2009)
and the scale parameter in export demand, , is chosen such that steady-state terms
of trade pss are normalized to 1.
The elasticities of substitution across varieties of consumption goods and labor
services, "p and "w, determine the desired markups in product and labor markets,
respectively. We set "p = 7, consistent with an initial price markup of "p=("p   1) =
1:17, which is consistent with the ndings of Montero and Urtasun (2013) for Spanish
rm-level data. To calibrate wage markups we follow Galí (2011) who interprets
EHL model of wage-setting in a way that delivers equilibrium unemployment (see
Appendix B for details). Targeting an unemployment rate of 8:6% in 2007, we obtain
an initial wage markup of "w=("w 1) = 1:43, which we achieve by setting "w = 3:31.
The elasticity of entrepreneurial output with respect to capital and real estate are
set to k = 0:11 and h = 0:21, which help to replicate the labor share of GDP in 2007
(61:6%) and the share of equipment capital in the total stock of productive capital.13
Following Iacoviello and Neri (2010) we set h = 0:01, whereas k is set to a standard
value of 0:025. The elasticity of construction output with respect to labor ! is chosen
13The value of equipment capital was estimated at 21:4% of the total value of productive capital
in 2007 (using data from BBVA Research).
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Table 1: Baseline calibration
Parameter Value Description
Preferences
u 0.994 unconstrained household discount factor
 0.98 constrained household discount factor
' 4 (inverse) labor supply elasticity
# 0.35 weight on housing utility
"p 7 elasticity of subst. across consumption varieties
"w 3.31 elasticity of substitution across labor varieties
!H 0.65 weight home goods in consumption basket
"H 1 elasticity of imports wrt terms of trade
"F 1 elasticity of exports wrt terms of trade
 0.83 scale parameter export demand
Technology
h 0.21 elasticity output wrt real estate
k 0.11 elasticity output wrt equipment
! 0.50 elasticity construction wrt labor
h 0.01 depreciation real estate
k 0.025 depreciation equipment
e; h 0.5 share of constr. households in labor baskets
h 12.0 investment adjustment costs construction
k 9.9 investment adjustment costs equipment
Price/wage setting
p 0.67 fraction of non-adjusting prices
w 0.75 fraction of non-adjusting wages
Debt constraints
m 0.85 household LTV ratio
me 0.69 entrepreneur LTV ratio
 0.98 amortization rate household debt
e 0.97 amortization rate entrepreneurial debt
Fiscal policy
 c 0.08 initial tax rate on consumption
w 0.16 initial tax rate on labor income
k 0.18 initial tax rate on capital income
g 0.57 initial government spending
bgy=4 0.80 long-run target for govt debt-to-annual GDP
bgy 0.035 response coe¢ cient in scal rule
bgy 0.387 response coe¢ cient in scal rule
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to match the construction share of total employment in 2007 (13:4%). We set the
weight of utility from housing services, #, to replicate gross household debt over
annual GDP (80:2%). The shares of constrained and unconstrained workers in the
labor baskets are set to h = e = 1=2. The scale parameters of convex investment
adjustment costs, h and k, are chosen such that the dynamics of construction and
equipment capital investment in our baseline deleveraging scenario resembles their
behavior during the crisis.14
The Calvo parameters are set to p = 2=3 and w = 3=4, such that prices and
wages are adjusted every 3 and 4 quarters on average, respectively. This is consistent
with survey evidence for the Spanish economy (see e.g. Druant et al., 2009).
Regarding the debt contract we set m = 0:85 for the households initial loan-
to-value ratio, consistently with Spanish evidence on pre-crisis LTV ratios for new
mortgages,15 while the entrepreneurial initial loan-to-value ratio, me = 0:69, is chosen
to match the ratio of gross non-nancial corporate debt to annual GDP (125:4%
in 2007). We calibrate the contractual amortization rates, 1    and 1   e, to
replicate the average age of the stock of outstanding mortgage debt prior to the
crisis: 1   = 0:02 and 1  e = 0:03 per quarter.16
As explained above, all scal instruments other than the one in the scal rule
(equation 14) are held constant at some initial values f sgs=c;w;k and g. We calibrate
the initial tax rates f sgs=c;w;k as in Stähler and Thomas (2012), who calculate
pre-crisis average implicit tax rates for di¤erent tax gures. We set g such that
g=gdpss equals the government spending share of GDP in 2007 (18:3%). In the
scal rule, we set the long-run target for the government debt-to-(quarterly) GDP
14The accumulated fall in construction and equipment capital investment 8 quarters after the
nancial shock replicate their accumulated fall 8 quarters after their peak in 2007:Q4 (24:5% and
28% respectively).
15See e.g. Masier and Villanueva (2011, Table A1), and Akin et al. (2014, Table A.1).
16Under our debt contracts (with a constant fraction of outstanding debt amortized each period),
the average age of the debt stock converges in the steady state to = (1  ) and e= (1  e)
for households and entrepreneurs, respectively. According to calculations by Banco de España,
based on data from the Land Registry o¢ ce and large nancial institutions, the average age of
outstanding mortgage debt prior to the crisis was close to 12:5 years for households and 8 years for
nonnancial corporations and entrepreneurs. This yields  = 12:5  4=(12:5  4 + 1) = 0:98 and
e = 8 4=(8 4 + 1) = 0:97.
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ratio to bgy = 0:80  4, consistently with levels reached in Spain only a few years
after the start of the crisis and with our focus on scenarios that involve a reduction in
government indebtedness towards the EU Treaty target (60% of GDP). The response
coe¢ cients in the rule, b and b, are calibrated to make the dynamic change
in current decit roughly comparable across consolidation scenarios based on the
di¤erent scal instruments. Table 1 summarizes the calibration.
Solution algorithm. We assume perfect foresight in all our simulations. We
solve for the fully nonlinear equilibrium path, using a variant of the Newton-Raphson
algorithm developed by La¤argue (1990), Boucekkine (1995) and Juillard (1996)
(LBJ).17 Our assumption of long-run debt contracts gives rise to two debt regimes
for households and entrepreneurs. If collateral values are above the contractual
debt amortization paths, then debt levels are restricted by the former, according to
equations (7) and (10). If the opposite holds, then new credit ows collapse to zero
and debt is restricted by the contractual amortization path (equations 8 and 11). We
have therefore modied the LBJ algorithm to allow for endogenous change of debt
regime. In particular, the dates at which the regime changes take place (which we
will denote by T  for entrepreneurs and T  and households) are solved as equilibrium
objects.
4 E¤ects of a scal consolidation
We rst look at the e¤ects of scal consolidations abstracting from any other dis-
turbances or policy changes. This allows us to isolate some channels of transmission
that will play a critical role in the full analysis of scal consolidations in a private
debt overhang presented later. To further clear the desk, for now we focus on one
specic scal instrument in (14), government spending (fi = g).18
In particular, we rst consider the e¤ects of reducing the long-run target for the
17See also Juillard et al. (1998) for an application of the LBJ variant of the Newton-Raphson
algorithm.
18The results using alternative scal instruments are qualitatively similar and are available on
request.
24
government debt-to-GDP ratio, bgy, from its initial value (80% of annual GDP). We
will refer to the numerical reduction in such target as the size of the scal consolida-
tion. Debt reduction is achieved through the scal rule in equation (14). In the rest
of the paper, a key outcome variable we will focus on is the scal sacrice ratio, which
following Erceg and Lindé (2013) is dened as the change in output (consumption)
relative to the size of the scal consolidation: yt=
bgy (ct= bgy).
Figures 1 and 2 depict the dynamic scal sacrice ratio associated to two di¤erent
consolidation sizes. The blue line represents this ratio when the scal adjustment is
designed to reduce the long-run government debt-to-GDP ratio bgy by 1 percentage
point (pp), whereas the red line corresponds to a much larger consolidation e¤ort
aimed at reducing that ratio by 20 pp. Before the (credible) reduction of the debt tar-
get is announced (t = 0), the economy rests in the steady state of the baseline regime,
where debt levels equal pledgeable collateral values.19 The exercise in Figure 1 is
simulated under the standard assumption of one-period private debt ( = e = 0),
whereas in Figure 2 we simulate our benchmark model featuring long-term household
and entrepreneurial debt in which the gross ow of new credit is non-negative. The
comparison of both models is useful to clarify the type of non-linearity that arises
here in the presence of long-term debt, due to the asymmetry in the borrowing con-
straints and the resulting potential for debt-regime changes. In our model, unlike in
models with one-period debt, the response to shocks need not be symmetric (as it
may depend on the sign of the shocks) nor proportional to the shock size. This has
implications for scal sacrice ratios across di¤erent consolidation scenarios (size,
gradualism, etc.).
In both cases, the contraction in public spending lowers GDP in a signicant and
persistent manner, due to the combination of the rise in the real interest rate and
the fall in asset prices and, hence, in borrowersnet worth. This e¤ect is common
to models with a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates (e.g. Erceg
and Lindé, 2013 and Eggertsson, 2010). In the absence of monetary accommodation,
19Indeed, the fact that constrained households and entrepreneurs are both more impatient than
unconstrained households,  < u, guarantees that the collateral constraint binds for both agents
in the steady state.
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scal multipliers are large. Moreover, they get amplied in our setting by the persis-
tent deterioration of borrowersnet worth. These e¤ects, combined with the negative
impact on labor income (due both to lower real wages and employment) induce a
prolonged recession.
Beyond this similarity, the dynamic path of output varies substantially across
these two di¤erent environments. In the case of short term debt (Figure 1), the
consolidation e¤ort has a homogenous e¤ect on the sacrice ratio with respect to
the size of the consolidation. On the contrary, when private debts are long-term
(Figure 2), the output response depends substantially on the size of the consolidation
program. More precisely, a small scale scal adjustment has a stronger short-run
relative e¤ect on output than larger consolidations, but this pattern is reversed in
the medium term, as a comparatively larger scal adjustment gives rise to higher
relative output losses.
Figure 1 Figure 2
To account for the di¤erences observed in Figure 2, we must bear in mind that
long-run debt contracts imply that debtorsdebt repayments are bounded by the
contractual amortization rate, which dampens the impact on their spending and
consumption capacity of shocks that reduce the net worth and the available collateral
relative to outstanding debt. Since the response of consumption plays a central role
in shaping the overall scal sacrice ratio, it is interesting to focus on how long-term
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debt shapes the response of this component of aggregate spending. Focusing on the
case of indebted households (the argument applies analogously to entrepreneurs),
when the scal shock is small so is the fall in collateral values and excess collateral
remains positive, i.e. mt
Rt
t+1p
h
t+1ht    bt 1t > 0. This allows borrowers to tap new
credit up to the limit dictated by collateral constraint (7), in which case the time-t
ow of new debt obeys the following expression,
bt   Rt 1
t
bt 1 =
mt
Rt
t+1p
h
t+1ht  
Rt 1
t
bt 1:
Along this path, the fall in collateral values, mt
Rt
t+1p
h
t+1ht; triggered by the scal
contraction reduces householdsnet debt ow one for one. This adds to the standard
debt-deation channel operating through the fall in ination that raises the real value
of the burden of outstanding debt, Rt 1
t
bt 1. Hence, the resulting contraction in net
debt ows reduces debtorsspending capacity.
By contrast, if the size of the scal consolidation is large enough to drive excess
collateral below zero, then the contractual amortization path becomes the e¤ective
debt limit: bt   bt 1t . Since this constraint holds in equilibrium as an equality,
householdsnet debt now evolves according to
bt   Rt 1
t
bt 1 =  

Rt 1   
t

bt 1:
This last expression shows how net debt ows, and hence consumption, are not
directly a¤ected by changes in collateral values while in this debt-regime. In fact,
in this debt regime the only e¤ect of the scal consolidation on net debt ows is
through the standard debt deation e¤ect, which in this case is second order since
Rt 1    is small.
The previous mechanism, by which long-term debt contracts isolate borrowers
spending capacity from the e¤ect of large falls in collateral values, may be interpreted
as a bu¤ering e¤ect of long-run debt. This e¤ect induces a some disconnection be-
tween debtorsnet worth and collateral holdings, on the one hand, and consumption,
on the other. This disconnection becomes apparent in Figure 3 that shows that for
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small scal adjustments (e.g. sizes 1 and 5) the downward adjustment of these vari-
ables is stronger, relative to the (absolute value of) the fall of net worth, whereas for
larger consolidations, these components of spending adjust much less. Thus, in the
short run large consolidations have a milder relative e¤ect on output than smaller
ones do.20
Figure 3
However, the impact reaction of GDP only provides a small piece of information
about the total output loss caused by a scal consolidation. While the short-term
sacrice ratio of larger consolidations gets moderated through the previous bu¤ering
e¤ect of long-term debt, larger consolidations cause a larger contraction of asset
prices and collateral values. For a su¢ ciently large consolidation, indebted consumers
are pushed into the negative excess collateral regime, in which fresh credit is zero
requiring a prolonged period of spending moderation until the relative levels of debt
and collateral are restored and new credit becomes accessible again.
Figure 4 illustrates this, comparing the evolution of household debt (as percent-
age of GDP) in a consolidation program that aims at reducing the public debt to
GDP ratio by 20 and 40 pp respectively.21 Following the implementation of a su¢ -
ciently large scal consolidation (20 pp), the excess collateral of the representative
20In our calibration, the impact response of aggregate consumption, relative to the size of the
consolidation program is three times as large in the case of small consolidations (rbgy = 1pp) than
in the case of larger ones (rbgy = 20pp).
21The e¤ects of the smallest consolidation, equivalent to the reduction of the target public debt
to GDP ratio by 1 pp are not shown in Figure 4. Small scal adjustments keep the economy in the
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constrained household becomes negative. As this situation prevails, the household
cannot access new loans and repays the existing debts at the contractual rate. After
8 quarters, the reduction in debt is su¢ cient to guarantee the accumulation of a
positive excess collateral and the household then regains access to new loans, giv-
ing rise to a releveragingprocess, along which the evolution of the stock of debt
becomes linked to that of collateral holdings. This turning point is represented in
our model by the statistic T . Thus, T  (T ) represents the endogenous duration
of the deleveraging phase for households (entrepreneurs). For a larger consolidation
(40 pp), the initial fall in borrowersnet worth and available collateral is signicantly
larger than in the previous case. The combination of an initial sharper fall in bor-
rowersnet worth and collateral and a stronger debt-deation e¤ect implies that the
fall of (negative) excess collateral gets amplied. Since the initial debt level, and the
contractual path of nominal debt amortization are the same as in the case of a milder
scal adjustment, it takes now much longer (14 quarters) for the same household to
recover the borrowing capacity.
Figure 4
Fiscal adjustments that accompany public debt consolidations produce a negative
positibe excess collateral regime in which fresh credit (bnewt ) is positive and there is not deleveraging
as such.
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impact on borrowersassets and income ows, but the evolution of long-term preex-
isting debts in the short run is largely una¤ected by the size of the scal shock if the
latter is big enough. Thus, larger consolidations produce a disproportionately large
negative impact on net worth, implying that indebted consumers nd themselves
with negative excess collateralfor a potentially long period. Given an initial level
of debt, sharp scal retrenchments lengthen the deleveraging phase for the private
sector until additional spending can be nanced with fresh credit. This is corrob-
orated by the response of T  and T  for consolidations of di¤erent sizes depicted
in Figure 5. Larger scal consolidations produce more persistent deleveraging, thus
postponing the recovery of credit and GDP. This duration e¤ectexplains why se-
vere consolidations produce larger medium-term relative output losses, as shown in
Figure 2.
Figure 5
Summing up, milder short run relative output costs of larger consolidations come
with a higher sacrice ratio in the long run. In light of this dynamic trade-o¤, it is
useful to summarize the overall e¤ects of alternative consolidations into two statistics.
A rst natural candidate is social welfare, which we dene as
E0
1X
t=0

(u)t U (cut ; h
u
t ; fnut g) + tU (cct ; ht; fnctg) + t log cet

;
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where U is the period utility function of households and entrepreneurs as introduced
in equations (4), (5) and (9). In particular, we compute the welfare loss of a scal
consolidation as the percentage change in permanent consumption that is required
to compensate for the e¤ects of the consolidation.
Table 2. Relative welfare and output losses
Fiscal shock
Size 1% 5% 20% 40%
welfare loss 0,016 0,017 0,020 0,023
discounted wel. loss -1,94 -1,96 -2,06 -2,27
[T ; T ] [0; 0] [0; 4] [3; 8] [6; 13]
Table 2 shows how the welfare loss, dened in this way and scaled by the con-
solidation size, increases monotonically as we move from smaller to larger consoli-
dations. These numbers reveal that the duration e¤ect (larger consolidations give
rise to longer and more deeper private deleveraging) dominates the bu¤ering e¤ect
(larger consolidations trigger a relatively lower GDP loss in the short run). As a
reection of this, the welfare loss is positively correlated with the duration of the
period of private debt adjustment. The same pattern is observed when the output
loss is computed in present value terms, despite the fact that the extra cost of larger
consolidations concentrates in the medium term.
5 Fiscal consolidations in a credit-crunch environ-
ment
In this section we exploit the framework introduced earlier to address three issues
regarding the connection between scal consolidation and private debt against the
backdrop of a process of private deleveraging process that is already unfolding as a
consequence of a negative nancial shock. In mind we have the recent experience of a
31
number of European countries where the main motivation for consolidating public -
nances came from the worsening of their macronancial landscape that followed from
the crisis initiated in 2008. In this sense, although we do not model the decision for
consolidating, we analyze its macroeconomic e¤ects in a more realistic environment
in which the trigger of private deleveraging is not primarily the result of the scal
retrenchment itself.
In this richer context, that combines scal policy shocks and nancial shocks, we
rst analyze, parallel to the exercise in the previous section, the relative cost of large
versus small consolidation programs; second, we study the relative cost of gradual
versus front-loaded consolidation programs; and, nally, we compare the e¤ects of
alternative instruments used to adjust the level of public debt to its target: public
spending, taxes on capital ( k) and consumption taxes ( c).22
Before that, to get a glimpse of the macroeconomic e¤ects of the nancial shock,
Figure 6 depicts the response of the main variables of the model in absence of the
scal consolidation. The baseline scenario is now one in which the model economy
is subject to an unexpected, gradual, permanent drop in the LTV ratios of both
households and entrepreneurs, as way of reecting the nancial origin of last global
crisis. In particular, we assume an autoregressive process: xt = (1  x) x + xxt 1,
x = m;me, where we set m = m
e
= 0:75. We then simulate an unanticipated fall
in the long-run LTV ratios ( m; me) of 5 percentage points from their baseline values
in Table 1, a conservative choice in the light of recent experience in Spain.23
This nancial shock is large enough to push the economy into the deleveraging
regime, even in the absence of any scal adjustment. Total consumption declines
as a result of the deleveraging process, and then it experiences successive recoveries
when, rst, entrepreneurs and, then, households regain access to new loans. The
shock has also a negative impact on total investment, driven by lower expenditure in
both real estate and equipment capital. Notice that investment recovers from t = 8
onwards i.e. before the process of entrepreneurial debt reduction is actually over
22In the rst two exercises we focus just on consolidations based in adjustments in public spending.
The results with scal rules dened in k and  c are qualitatitevely similar.
23Data from the Spanish Land Registry o¢ ce shows that average LTV ratios for new mortgages
declined by 7:7 percentage points in the 6 years between 2007:Q3 and 2013:Q3.
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(t = 9). This initial creditless recovery in investment is nanced with an increase in
borrowersinternal saving.24
Figure 6
Macroeconomic adjustment to a nancial crisis
The deationary process caused by the nancial shock leads to a temporary de-
preciation of the terms of trade, which fosters gross exports. On the other hand,
imports fall due to the combined e¤ect of the terms-of-trade depreciation and the
severe contraction in domestic demand. Both e¤ects give rise to a substantial im-
provement in net exports during the deleveraging period. The positive contribution
of the external sector, however, is not su¢ cient to avoid a protracted recession that
lasts two years. As shown in Andrés, Arce and Thomas (2015), the presence of long-
run debt allows the model to replicate reasonably well the dynamics of private debt
observed during historical deleveraging episodes.
24From t = 0 until T  entrepreneurs reduce their consumption, which in our framework may be
interpreted as dividend payments, thus increasing their retained earnings.
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5.1 The size of the scal adjustment
We discuss now the output e¤ects of the size of the consolidation program. Figure
7 depicts the scal sacrice ratio associated to spending-based consolidations of two
di¤erent sizes: 1 pp (blue line) and 20 pp (red line). Since now there are two
shocks operating simultaneously, in what follows we calculate the GDP e¤ect of a
scal consolidation (yfct ) as the di¤erence between the GDP path in the scenario
with both nancial and scal shocks and that in the baseline scenario, that only
incorporates the nancial shock. The sacrice ratio is then given by yfct =
bgy.
Figure 7
Notice rst that the main results from the analysis in section 4 are preserved in
the presence of a separate nancial shock: (i) the scal adjustment makes the re-
cession deeper and more persistent (vis-à-vis the nancial-shock-only scenario); (ii)
smaller adjustments have greater relative e¤ects in the short run; and (iii) larger con-
solidations are more costly in relative terms over the medium run. Moreover, a quick
comparison with Figure 2 reveals that the additional medium-run costs caused by
the scal consolidation is somewhat higher when the economy is contemporaneously
undergoing a private deleveraging process.
Both, the bu¤ering e¤ect and the duration e¤ect show up in this context too.
Compared with the sacrice ratio in the scal solo case in Figure 2, the former ef-
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fect seems to be weaker now, whereas the duration e¤ect remains strong.25 The
latter e¤ect can be observed in more detail in Figure 8 that portrays the response to
the deleveraging shock of collateral values (dashed lines) and the actual equilibrium
path of outstanding debt (thick solid lines) of entrepreneurs and households. The
deleveraging shock is accompanied by a government spending-based scal consoli-
dation of 1 pp (red lines) and 20 pp (blue lines) respectively. Before these shocks
take place (t = 0) the economy rests in the steady state of the baseline regime, but
the credit crunch shock drives collateral values below the contractual amortization
paths already on impact (t = 1), an e¤ect that is amplied by the scal contraction.
Therefore, the economy enters the alternative regime in which entrepreneurial and
household debt stocks decay at the contractual amortization rates. In this phase,
the economy undergoes a gradual and prolonged deleveraging process. Eventually,
collateral values rise again above the contractual amortization path, at which point
borrowers are able to regain access to fresh funds (periods T  and T ). Deleveraging
lasts longer for households than for entrepreneurs, which mainly reects the slower
amortization rate assumed for the former (1    < 1   e) and, more importantly,
the bigger scal shock associated to the consolidation of 20 pp amplies the strength
and the duration of private sector deleveraging.
25Di¤erences in the short run multiplier among the two consolidation exercises, are now dampened
by the fact that the nancial shock gets the economy into the deleveraging regime even for the small
consolidation program.
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Figure 8
Collateral and debt in a nancial crisis
Since the sacrice ratios plotted in Figure 7 are in di¤erences with respect to the
baseline in which there is no scal shock, the downward spikes in the red line (size
20 pp) represent the additional GDP loss caused by the larger scal consolidation
through the lengthening of the deleveraging process (i.e. higher T  and T ). These
spikes do not show up in the consolidation of size 1 pp since in this case the scal
shock is small enough to leave the duration of the deleveraging phase una¤ected. On
the contrary, the spending cut associated to the 20 pp consolidation postpones the
exit from deleveraging by four quarters for both entrepreneurs and households with
respect to baseline scenario of no scal policy change. This in turn drags down the
recovery of GDP, producing signicant and persistent losses over the medium run.
As in the no nancial shock case analyzed earlier, both the welfare loss and the
present discounted value of the GDP loss (per unit of bgy reduction) rise with the
size of the consolidation (Table 3), since the duration e¤ect that delays the exit from
private deleveraging outweighs the short-run bu¤ering e¤ect.
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Table 3. Relative welfare and output losses
Cum nancial shock
Size 1% 20%
Rel. welf. loss 0,024 0,026
Rel. PV(ry) -2,1 -2,5
[T ; T ] [8; 15] [11; 19]
5.2 Gradualism vs front-loading
There is another dimension of scal consolidations that has been much discussed in
policy circles, namely the appropriate pace of debt (or decit) adjustment. So far we
have kept constant the speed of scal consolidation as captured by the (instrument-
adjusted) coe¢ cients in the scal rule, and focused on di¤erences across consolidation
sizes. In this section we x the consolidation size at 20 percentage points and con-
sider di¤erent values of the response coe¢ cient (b) to debt deviations from target
(bgyt 1   bgy). In this way we analyze two types of scal adjustments: front-loaded
consolidations (high b), and gradual consolidations (low b).
26
The key question is to what extent the speed of adjustment a¤ects the response
of GDP and interacts with the duration and intensity of private-sector deleveraging
(T ; T ). As can be seen in Figure 9, a higher degree of gradualism reduces the
short/medium-run costs of the scal consolidation, but raises the longer-run costs.
26Given our assumption that government debt is riskless, we assume away any risk premium on
its price and, hence, we abstract from any hypothetical e¤ect of di¤erent consolidation paths on
the spread. In mind we have a scenario in which the government credibly commits to reducing
its debt ratio in the rst place, irrespectively of the specic rule chosen to accomplish the scal
consolidation and its pace. Alternatively, the previous assumption can be understood as reecting
a situation in which the stock of government debt is never so high so as to generate any appreciable
doubt about its sustainability (see Bi, 2012).
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Figure 9
Some authors defend a more gradual pace of consolidation, arguing that gradual-
ism helps to avoid large scal shocks in the short run, i.e. at the time when the scal
multiplier is presumably larger, specially in a context with high levels of private debt
and lack of room for maneuver on the side of monetary policy. The main reason why
gradualism is less costly in our model is di¤erent. Front-loaded consolidations are
more costly in the short run since they entail larger scal shocks in the early years of
the scal program that, in turn, prolong the duration and the intensity of the private
deleveraging period. The deleveraging process and the recession last longer as the
speed of the scal consolidation increases, which has a signicant impact on cur-
rent spending of forward looking households and rms. As shown in Table 4 below,
front-loaded consolidations delay the exit from the deleveraging phase substantially:
relative to a gradual consolidation, it takes 4 and 2 additional quarters for house-
holds and entrepreneurs to regain access to new credit respectively.27 Welfare losses
of scal consolidation, relative to the no-consolidation scenario, increase as a larger
part of the debt-reduction e¤ort is exerted in the early years of the program and are
more intense for constrained households and entrepreneurs than for unconstrained
27Similar results are obtained if gradualism concerns the smoothing parameter bgy in a general-
ized specication that allows for a time-varying debt ratio target (bgyt ),
bgyt = bgy
bgyt 1 + (1  bgy )bgy:
These results are also available upon request.
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households.
Table 4. Welfare costs of scal consolidation in a nancial crisis
Welfare losses T ; T 
Scenario Aggr. U. HHs C. HHs C. Entr.
Front-loaded 0.67 0.15 1.47 1.58 [12; 22]
Baseline 0.55 0.9 1.18 1.37 [11; 19]
Gradual 0.42 0.6 0.91 1.08 [10; 18]
Note: welfare costs in % of permanent consumption
5.3 Alternative instruments
Finally we look at the comparative e¤ects of a consolidation of a given size (20
pp) based on alternative scal instruments: government spending (gt), consumption
tax ( ct), and capital income tax (
k
t ).
28 As can be seen in Figure 10, di¤erent
instruments give rise to distinct patterns in the impact and medium-run output
response, out of which several features stand out.29 First, consolidations implemented
trough adjustments in taxes induce more moderate output losses in the short run than
those based on government spending cuts; second, other than the more pronounced
fall in GDP following adjustments in gt, the dynamic pattern of output is very similar
to the one following changes in  ct ; and, third, while the response of output in the
short run is very similar for consolidations based on  kt and 
c
t , as the negative e¤ect
of capital income tax hikes on debtors net worth and collateral accumulation gathers
momentum, adjustments in  kt becomes the costliest alternative.
28The coe¢ cients of the rules have been chosen so that adjustment in di¤erent instruments lead
to equal responses of the public decit at time t = 1. The e¤ects of consolidations based on labor
income taxes (wt ) are relatively similar to those of a consumption tax-based consolidation, and we
thus omit them for brevity.
29As discussed in the context of Figure 7, in Figure 10, the spikes in the GDP e¤ects reect
scally-induced changes in T  and T  (and hence in the dates at which the consumption spikes
associated to the end of deleveraging take place) relative to the baseline no-consolidation scenario.
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Figure 10
These patterns can be explained by the evolution of the nancial conditions of the
various agents. Eggertsson (2010) and Erceg and Lindé (2013), among others, have
explained why government spending cuts might be more damaging than tax hikes
when the monetary policy cannot accommodate the scal shock. When the economy
is away from the ZLB, tax increases are less deationary than spending cuts since
the negative demand e¤ect is compensated in the case of taxes by increases in the
marginal cost. Thus monetary policy accommodation is stronger following spending
cuts. By contrast, when the ZLB is binding, the impact of these two scal instruments
have the opposite e¤ect on the real interest rate: spending cuts raise it more than
tax hikes do, hence, the former go hand on hand with higher scal multipliers.
Consolidations based on both g-cuts and  c-hikes give rise to similar time-patterns
for the sacrice ratio, with the aforementioned di¤erences in their magnitude, since
both instruments have a symmetric impact on the length of households and entrepre-
neurs deleveraging, i.e T  = T  in both cases. Losses caused by spending cuts
are larger, in part, because the duration e¤ect on private deleveraging is nonetheless
stronger than in the case of consumption tax rises, specically, T jg = T jg = 4
qrts, versus T jc = T jc = 1 qrt.
Finally, the instrument that exerts the most distinctive impact on the dynamics
of GDP is  k. This reects the fact that the adjustment in capital income taxes
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unchains a disproportionate e¤ect on the dynamics of deleveraging of entrepreneurs:
T jk = 4, T jk = 1. Thus the e¤ect of capital income tax hikes on investment
and collateral accumulation is stronger than that on consumption, which explains a
more gradual but eventually stronger fall of GDP as compared with the impact of  c
and g. While hikes in capital income taxes have mild short-run e¤ects on consump-
tion and output (similar to those of consumption tax increases), by inhibiting the
accumulation of collateralizable capital assets (and keeping their market value low),
they lead to longer and deeper private deleveraging and hence to higher medium-and
long-run output losses.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the interaction between scal consolidations and private sector
deleveraging in an economy inside a monetary union. We have focused on the macro-
economic impact of the size, composition and pace (gradualism) of consolidation
programs, in particular, thorough the interaction between scal consolidations and
private debt deleveraging. To this aim, we have developed a model that sheds light
on several largely unexplored channels of mutual feedback between private and public
debt reduction processes.
In particular, we nd that very short-run scal multipliers are smaller for large
scale consolidation programs, but medium-run multipliers increase with consolidation
size. Larger consolidations delay the end of private deleveraging and make it more
intense and costly. Long term private secured (mortgaged) debt plays a critical role
in these results. As opposed to the canonical assumption of one-period debt, allowing
for more realistic maturity proles for private loans limits the speed of deleveraging,
at the cost, however, of making it lengthier. In this way, long-term debt provides
some cushioning on private spending after a negative shock. In the case of a scal
shock induced by a lower target for the long-run public debt ratio this cushioning
e¤ect is more important, in relative terms, for large scal consolidations, thus giving
rise to a negative relation between the size of the consolidation and its associated
output cost on impact. On the ip side, larger consolidations depress the value
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of collateral and the net worth of borrowers. To the extent that the debt contract
prevents a similar downward adjustment in consumption, borrowersexcess collateral
plunges into negative territory and it takes longer to recover before they can access to
fresh credit. This delays the process of private debt absorption, making the recession
longer. Also, through a similar channel, front-loaded consolidation programs delay
the recovery, amplifying the short/medium run cost of the scal adjustment.
In short, the e¤ect of a scal consolidation on the duration and intensity of
private debt deleveraging turns out to be a powerful mechanism of transmission of the
consolidation costs, and one that has been largely neglected in the previous literature.
Indeed, some welfare-based measures reveal that more gradual strategies facilitate
a faster recovery of borrowersnet worth and credit. In this way, a more gradual
pace for consolidating public nances mitigates the associated costs. Likewise, the
previous lengthening e¤ect on the duration of the recession, along with the lack of
nominal interest reaction, explains also the large di¤erential GDP e¤ects of scal
adjustments based on alternative budgetary instruments: public spending, indirect
taxes and capital income taxes.
In interpreting these results, it is worth recalling that we have analyzed a model
economy where the scal authority can credibility commit to alternative consolida-
tion paths, all of which render public debt sustainable. Hence, we do not consider
an endogenous response of sovereign spreads. In some real-life contexts, as it could
have been the case in a number of euro area countries during the turbulences in the
sovereign debt markets in 2010-2012, this last channel can constitute a powerful argu-
ment in favor of fast consolidation programs. In this sense, our benchmark economy
can be best understood as one where any potential obstacles limiting the credibility
of the government to pursue a given scal strategy have already been dispelled. Al-
ternatively, one might interpret our exercises as featuring changes in the degree of
scal gradualism of a magnitude not large enough so as to trigger a reassessment of
the credibility of the scal strategy by the holders of government debt.
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Appendix
A. Equilibrium conditions
Let ~pt  ~PH;t=PH;t, pH;t  PH;t=Pt, wt  Wt=Pt, ~wt  ~Wt=Wt, wt  Wt=Wt 1.
Equilibrium conditions:
 Unconstrained household budget constraint and rst-order conditions (dt, hut ),
cut + dt + p
h
t

hut   (1  h)hut 1

=
Rt 1
t
dt 1 + (1  w)wtnut   Tt; (16)
1
cut
= uEt
Rt
t+1
1
cut+1
; (17)
pht
cut
=
#
hut
+ uEt
(1  h) pht+1
cut+1
: (18)
 Constrained household budget constraint, debt constraints, and rst-order con-
ditions (bt, ht),
cct +
Rt 1
t
bt 1 + pht [ht   (1  h)ht 1] = bt + (1  w)wtnct   Tt; (19)
bt 
(
R 1t mtEtt+1p
h
t+1ht; if mtR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1ht  bt 1=t;
bt 1=t; if mtR 1t Ett+1p
h
t+1ht < bt 1=t;
(20)
1
cct
= Et
Rt
t+1
1
cct+1
+ t1 (#t  0)+t1 (#t < 0) Et
t+1
t+1
1 (#t+1 < 0) ; (21)
pht
cct
=
#
ht
+ Et
(1  h) pht+1
cct+1
+ t1 (#t  0)
mt
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+1; (22)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (8) in the text, 1 () is the
indicator function and #t  R 1t mtEtt+1pht+1ht   bt 1=t.
 Entrepreneur budget constraint, debt constraints, and rst-order conditions
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(bet , h
e
t , n
e
t , kt),
cet = mctk
k
t 1
 
het 1
h (net)1 h k   wtnet   pht het   (1  h)het 1
+bet  
Rt 1
t
bet 1   qt [kt   (1  k) kt 1] + rt +ht +kt ; (23)
bet 
(
R 1t m
e
tEtt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t ; if m
e
tR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t  ebet 1=t;
ebet 1=t; if m
e
tR
 1
t Ett+1p
h
t+1h
e
t < 
ebet 1=t;
(24)
1
cet
= Et
Rt
t+1
1
cet+1
+et1 (#
e
t  0)+et1 (#et < 0) eEt
et+1
t+1
1
 
#et+1 < 0

; (25)
pht
cet
= Et
mct+1hk
k
t (h
e
t)
h 1  net+11 h k + (1  h) pht+1
cet+1
+et
met
Rt
Ett+1p
h
t+11 (#
e
t  0) ;
(26)
wt = mct (1  h   k) kkt 1
 
het 1
h (net ) h k ; (27)
qt
cet
= Et
mct+1kk
k 1
t (h
e
t)
h
 
net+1
1 h k + (1  k) qt+1
cet+1
; (28)
where et is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (8) in the text, and #
e
t 
R 1t m
e
tEtt+1p
h
t+1h
e
t   ebet 1=t.
 Retailersoptimal price decision, and aggregate prots,
Et
1X
s=0
(p)
s c
e
t
cet+s
"
(1   p) ~ptQs
j=1 H;t+j
pH;t+s   "p
"p   1mct+s
# Qs
j=1 H;t+j
~pt
!"p
yt+s = 0;
(29)
rt = yt ((1   p) pH;t  mctt) ; (30)
 Dynamics of PPI ination and price dispersion,
1 = (1  ) ~p1 "pt + "p 1H;t ; (31)
t  (1  ) ~p "pt + "pH;tt 1: (32)
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 Construction rm output, rst order conditions (nht , iht ), and prots,
Iht =
 
nht
!(
iht
"
1  h
2

iht
iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
; (33)
wt = p
h
t !
 
nht
! 1(
iht
"
1  h
2

iht
iht 1
  1
2#)1 !
; (34)
1 = pht
 
nht
!
(1  !)

iht

1  h
2
 
diht
2 ! 
1  h
2
 
diht
2   h  diht  ihtiht 1

+
et+1
et
pht+1
 
nht+1
!
(1-!)

iht+1

1  h
2
 
diht+1
2 !
hdi
h
t+1

iht+1
iht
2
;(35)
ht = p
h
t I
h
t   wtnht   iht ; (36)
for diht  iht =iht 1   1.
 Equipment capital producers output, rst order condition (it), and prots,
It = it
"
1  k
2

it
it 1
  1
2#
; (37)
1 = qt

1  k
2
(dit)
2   k (dit) it
it 1

+ Et
et+1
et
qt+1kdit+1
i2t+1
i2t
; (38)
kt = qtIt   it; (39)
for dit  it=it 1   1.
 Optimal wage decision,
X
x=c;u
Et
1X
s=0
(xw)
s
2664 (1-w) ~wtsQ
j=1
w;t+j
wt+s
cxt+s
-
"w
 
nxt+s
'
"w-1
0BB@ ~wtsQ
j=1
w;t+j
1CCA
 "w'3775
0BB@
sQ
j=1
w;t+j
~wt
1CCA
"w
nxt+s=0;
(40)
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with c = .
 Dynamics of wage ination and wage dispersion,
1 = (1  w) ~w1 "wt + w"w 1wt ; (41)
w;nt = (1  w) ~w "wt + w"wwtw;nt 1: (42)
 Fiscal authoritys budget constraint,
wwt (n
c
t + n
u
t ) +  ppH;tyt + 2Tt = 0:
 Aggregate employment,
N ct = n
c
t
w;n
t ; (43)
Nut = n
u
t
w;n
t ; (44)
Nt = N
c
t +N
u
t ; (45)
 Export demand,
xt =  (p

t )
 "F yF;t: (46)
 Intermediate good market clearing,
ytt = k
k
t 1
 
het 1
h (net)1 h k ; (47)
 Labor market clearing,
nct + n
u
t = n
e
t + n
h
t : (48)
 Consumption goods basket market clearing,
yt = c
c
H;t + c
u
H;t + c
e
H;t + iH;t + i
h
H;t + xt: (49)
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 Real estate market clearing,
ht + h
u
t + h
e
t = I
h
t + (1  h)
 
ht 1 + hut 1 + h
e
t 1

: (50)
 Equipment capital market clearing,
kt = (1  k) kt 1 + It: (51)
 Real wages,
wt = wt 1
wt
t
; (52)
 Terms of trade,
pt = p

t 1
H;t
F;t
: (53)
 Relative demand for domestic goods,
ccH;t = !Hp
 "H
H;t c
c
t ; (54)
cuH;t = !Hp
 "H
H;t c
u
t ; (55)
ceH;t = !Hp
 "H
H;t c
e
t ; (56)
iH;t = !Hp
 "H
H;t it; (57)
ihH;t = !Hp
 "H
H;t i
h
t ; (58)
 Relative demand for constrained/unconstrained household labor,
(1  )nct = nut ; (59)
where   e = h.
 Relative domestic producer prices,
pH;t = pH;t 1
H;t
t
; (60)
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 CPI ination,
1 "Ht =
!H
 
pt 1
1 "H
!H
 
pt 1
1 "H + 1  !H 1 "HH;t + 1  !H!H  pt 11 "H + 1  !H ; (61)
 Real (PPI-deated) GDP,
gdpt = yt +
1
pH;t
(qtIt   it) + 1
pH;t
 
pht I
h
t   iht

; (62)
 Gross nominal interest rate,
Rt = R
 exp

  dt   bt   b
e
t
pH;tgdpt

: (63)
B. Equilibrium unemployment
Following Galí (2011), we assume that each representative household consists of a
unit squared of individuals indexed by (i; j) 2 [0; 1]  [0; 1], where i represents the
variety of labor service provided by the individual and j indexes her disutility from
working, given by j'. Let nxt (i) denote the number of variety-i workers in household
x = c; u employed at time t. Total household disutility from working is given by

Z 1
0
Z nxt (i)
0
j'djdi = 
Z 1
0
nxt (i)
1+'
1 + '
di;
for x = c; u. Given the type-specic wage Wt (i), the number of type-i workers that
each household would like to send to work is given by
argmax
nxt (i)
(
xt
Wt (i)
Pt
nxt (i)  
nxt (i)
1+'
1 + '
)
=

xt

Wt (i)
Pt
1='
 lxt (i) ;
for x = c; u, where xt  1=cxt . Unemployment in the market for type-i labor is
just the number of workers willing to work at the going wage minus e¤ective labor
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demand: ut (i) 
P
x=c;u l
x
t (i) 
P
x=c;u n
x
t (i) :Let
lxt 
Z 1
0
lxt (i) di =

xt

Wt
Pt
1=' Z 1
0

Wt (i)
Wt
1='
di =

xt

Wt
Pt
1='
w;lt ;
Nxt 
Z 1
0
nxt (i) di = n
x
t
Z 1
0

Wt (i)
Wt
 "w
di = nxt
w;n
t ;
denote total household-specic labor supply and labor demand, respectively, for x =
c; u, where w;lt 
R 1
0
(Wt (i) =Wt)
1=' di and w;nt 
R 1
0
(Wt (i) =Wt)
 "w di are indexes
of wage dispersion. Then aggregate unemployment is
ut 
Z 1
0
ut (i) di = lt  Nt:
where lt 
P
x=c;u l
x
t and Nt 
P
x=c;uN
x
t are aggregate labor supply and labor
demand, respectively. Finally, the unemployment rate is uratet  ut=lt.
6.1 C. The size of the scal adjustment:  k and  k based
consolidations.
Figure C1 and C2 display the GDP e¤ects of scal consolidations based on capital
income and consumption taxes respectively. In the gure we appreciate a similar
pattern in the comparison across di¤erent consolidation sizes: a large consolida-
tion produces (slightly) smaller short-run costs, but persistently higher costs in the
medium run.
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Figure C1 Figure C2
The economics of these responses is similar to that following an adjustment in
government spending. As to the di¤erences between both tax-based consolidations,
they reect their distinct e¤ect on T  and T . The downward spikes observed in the
case of the consumption tax-based consolidation reect the fact that T  and T  are
both delayed relative to the no-consolidation scenario. This pattern is very similar to
the one observed in the case of g adjustment, although the delay in the deleveraging
process is less intense in this case (one quarter here versus four quarters in the case of
g). When consolidations are implemented via adjustments in capital income taxes, we
observe a single downward spike associated to the larger consolidation (20 pp). This
is due to the fact that the relevant e¤ect of this tax rate, as far as the deleveraging
period is concerned, operates mainly via T , which is delayed by 4 quarters. Thus,
as discussed above, it is through lower capital accumulation by entrepreneurs that
consolidations based on capital income tax hikes produce persistent output losses.
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